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groups is a fairly new area of the literature and what facets of society impact the duration 
of the groups. This research proposes a cultural lens to examine the longevity of terrorist 
groups. Drawing upon Geert Hofstede’s dimensionalized cultural variables, which 
identify six different facets of culture, this study aims to find out if culture impacts the 
longevity of terrorist groups. Taking a quantitative approach the research utilizes a 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Around the world, the duration of terrorist groups has varied considerably.  In Brazil, the  
Vanguarda Armada Revolucionaria Palmares (VARS) lasted only four years (Jones and Libicki 
2008).  In Nigeria, the Odua Peoples’ Congress group lasted 13 years, the Filipino group 
Kabataang Makabayan lasted 44 years, Ireland’s Irish Republican Army (IRA) lasted 86 years, 
and the American Ku Klux Klan has lasted for more than 140 (Jones and Libicki 2008).  While 
groups and countries vary considerably, which perhaps accounts for much of this variation, there 
exists many states that appear similar – and thus equally likely to support a terrorist organization 
– yet in one a terrorist group endures and in the other it quickly fizzles out.  This variation 
amongst seemingly equal states leads to the puzzle - why do some groups last longer than others? 
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As an illustration, I use Brazil and Argentina.  Both states have fairly similar Polity (Marshall, 
Gurr, and Jaggers 2017) scores – 8 for Brazil and 9 for Argentina -  making them both 
democracies.1 They both have similar government and legal structures; each are presidential 
republics with civil law legal systems (Osiel, 1995). Economically, both states have national 
income averages that fall in the middle tier and both states have experienced terrorism in the past 
(Jones and Libicki 2008) 
Given these similarities, they demonstrate interesting differences between their terrorist groups. 
For Brazil – as stated above – the Vanguarda Armada Revolucionária Palmares (VARS) 
organization only lasted for four years. In Argentina, the People’s Revolutionary Army lasted for 
17 (Jones and Libicki 2008). Both groups had similar membership sizes (in the hundreds), were 
both left-wing, and had the same end goal of regime change (Jones and Libicki 2008). How is it 
that two groups in seemingly identical states, with identical group characteristics, last for such 
drastically different times? 
While there has been a growing amount of research conducted on the factors that cause groups to 
endure and decline (Crenshaw 1991; Vittori 2009; Miller 2012); the literature remains limited. 
First, much of the research remains rooted in explanations of a group’s activity such as number of 
attacks, targets, and types of operations (Vittori 2009).  Second, of the limited amount of work 
directed toward group survival, it remains focused on common political science variables such as 
a state’s economy or regime type (Crenshaw 1981; Ross 1993).  I argue that the key to this 
mystery may not simply lie in a state’s structural variables like those discussed above, but rather 
in its cultural infrastructure.  In particular, I argue that state-level culture is reflected within 
                                                             
1 Both scores are for 2016.  Both countries have had a similar history of non-democratic governance.  Each 
became a democracy, at least according to Polity standards, by the mid 1980s.   
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organizational processes; groups embody their society’s cultures and these cultures may be 
helpful or ruinous to an organization’s lifespan.   
My study uses Hofstede’s (1983) Cultural Dimensions Theory, to explore how a state’s socio-
cultural environment affects the longevity of a terrorist organization.  In particular, I examine six 
different variables for culture and I assess their impact on group longevity. The six variables that 
I use are: 1.) the Power Distance Index which measures the distribution of power and inequality 
of a state’s culture, 2.) the Individualism vs. Collectivism dimension which measures the social 
framework of groups 3.) the Masculinity vs. Femininity dimension which examines the learned 
behavioural characteristics of individuals within a state and how they manage conflict and 
competition within a group. 4.) the Uncertainty Avoidance Index which evaluates a state’s overall 
level of traditionalism; 5.) the Long-Term vs Short-Term Orientation dimension, which examines 
the habits of how groups prepare for future change and advancements in society and 6.) and the 
Indulgence vs. Restraint Index – which measures the extent of self-gratification. 
This type of analysis, while unorthodox, is important for a number of reasons.  First, looking at 
culture and organizational processes provides a new level of insight.  The individuals who make 
up terrorist organizations are products of their respective cultural and organizational 
environments.  This creates more variation that cannot be seen when doing state-level analyses.  
This allows us to better understand group duration.  Second, by examining groups using culture, 
we can better understand the underpinnings of group behavior and potentially shed light on how 
some groups can operate successfully while others do not. Additionally, this type of analysis can 
open up the doors for further research and more in-depth analysis on cultural dimensions to gain a 
better understanding how culture plays a role in the operations of terrorist groups.  
I am careful to note that my analysis does not make a claim about the superiority or perceived 
dangers of one culture over another (see Huntington 1996; for a contrasting view see Said 2001, 
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Berman 2003).  In fact, each state’s culture probably contains features that both aggravate and 
reduce the threat of terrorism.  Understandably, this means that not many scholars have attempted 
to do an analysis of this sort (although see Chomsky 2015; Arena and Arrigo 2005; Mutua 2002).  
By using a theory that operationalizes aspects of culture for quantitative analyses, I am merely 
evaluating whether some cultural components have an effect on group longevity and not making a 
normative judgement about individual cultures.  This study will take a quantitative approach to 
see if culture affects group longevity. I will begin my research by analyzing the literatures on 
terrorism as well as culture. After establishing this foundation, I will develop my theory.  I note 
that state culture impacts organizational culture and that the six components of Hofstede (1983) 
have different effects on group longevity.  I then proceed into the research methods.  In order to 
test my hypotheses relating culture to organizational longevity, I run a Cox Proportional Hazards 
Model (Cox 1972, 1975).  After running my models and compiling the results, I will discuss my 
findings.  Lastly, I will provide potential research suggestions and discussion regarding my 
findings’ impact on policy.   
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
 
This section will look at the multiple factors that play a role in terrorist group longevity. First, I 
discuss the literature on the definition of terrorism.  It is important to discuss the different 
definitions of terrorism because it allows us to determine what does and does not constitute a 
terrorist organization. Second, I explore the various causal mechanisms related to the occurrence 
of terrorism.  Third, I discuss organizational explanations for terrorist behavior, particularly work 
that explains the duration of terrorist groups.  From there, I introduce culture as an additional 
explanation for why some organizations endure. Understanding why these groups endure longer 
than others is crucial in figuring out what policies can be introduced in order to   
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better combat the operations of terrorist groups. Policies that decrease group’s abilities to endure 
in their respective environments, can potentially reduce the operations within terrorist groups.  
Defining Terrorism 
In recent times, this form of violence appears to be a religious phenomenon that is often 
correlated with radical Islam.  Terrorism, however, has long historical roots and has not always 
been associated with religion. The origin of the word terrorism, is in fact, attributed to the French 
Revolution (Giddons 2006). During the revolution, terrorism was not necessary a negative 
concept and instead was perceived as a way to maintain order (Hoffman 1998). The 
“revolutionary” definition of terrorism in regard to movements and violence toward governments 
shifted to representing violent anarchist acts that aimed to completely remove government 
authority. An example of this is the Narodnaya Volya (sometimes referred to as the People’s 
Will), which attempted to assassinate Tsar Alexander II. By the 1930s, the word transitioned to a 
meaning that illustrated the oppression put on by governments toward their respective citizens. 
Stalin’s regime is an example of what this new form of terrorism represented as he reigned with 
terror, oppressing the people of the Soviet Union (Hoffman 1998).  
The concept of terrorism then shifted again during the post-colonialism era, most notably after the 
Second World War. States, once occupied by European colonizers, viewed their occupiers as 
weaker than they thought them to be, therefore the appeal to rebel became increasingly prevalent 
amongst citizens in these states. For instance, the National Liberation Front in Algeria was 
created in opposition of the French government.  During the 1990s, there was a rise in terrorism 
associated with religious actors, thus merging the idea of terrorism with that of religious 
motivations that is seen today.  
This complex history has made defining terrorism difficult. Weinberg et al (2004) discusses the 
complexities of defining terrorism. They explore the various facets of terrorism by using Schmid 
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and Jongman’s (1988) survey where 22 “elements” were established to identify what defined 
terrorism. These elements were established based on frequency in other literature in order to 
analyze which themes were most commonly associated with terrorism.  By doing so, the study 
provided a statistical occurrence of each element in order to establish a consensus of what the 
definition or “meaning” of terrorism was.   
The responses provided a range of results that provoked more questions.  One example is whether 
an attack on government can be considered terrorism like an attack on everyday people might be 
(Weinberg et al 2004). Another issue is whether states can be considered terrorists, some have 
argued that they can (Primoratz 2004; Stohl 1984; Blakeley 2007; Miller 1996). This is important 
because state-sponsored terrorism has some elements that are different than non-state sponsored 
terrorism in regards to their goals, recruitment, and tactics. While non-state groups may seek 
regime or policy change, state-sanctioned groups may utilize tactics in order to maintain control 
over the population and establish governments.  The complicates the process of identifying 
groups because by including state governments in the pool of groups, the criteria used to identify 
terrorist groups no longer can be used equally among non-state actors and state-actors.  
Ganor (2002) finds that it is almost impossible to unanimously define terrorism because of the 
normative implications that come with defining the act and actors.  This is most similar to the 
statement that “One man’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter.”  This is problematic for 
an operative definition because it essentially makes the idea of terrorism subjective to the 
individual doing the definition. (Ganor 2002)   This has been reflected in debates within the 
United Nations; states that are the product of decolonization do not wish to define movements for 
national liberation as terrorist (Mars 1975).  This is not violence done for the sake of violence, 
they argue, but violence done to make people free (Fanon 1973).  The ambiguity about who is 
and who is not a terrorist can also extend to a single country; Crenshaw (1981, 379) notes that 
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“terrorism occurs both in the context of violent resistance to the state as well as in the service of 
state interests.” 
Even with these many problems, there are a few areas of consensus.  Bjorgo (2005) notes the 
seemingly universal agreement that terrorism consists of the incitement of fear amongst the 
targeted population. He believes this can be universally agreed upon because groups that are 
considered terrorists tend to always commit some sort of violent act toward a group of people. 
Another area of consensus is that terrorism seeks some sort of political goal (Ganor 2002).  The 
goals range from regime change to policy change to social revolution. One example of this may 
be al-Qaeda. At face value, the group may look as if it is solely religious in motive; much of their 
rhetoric is couched in religion. It’s true motive, as Wilkinson (2003) mentions, was to force the 
United States out of Saudi Arabia. 
For the sake of this study, I use the definition offered by the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) 
(START 2017, 9); they define terrorism as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and 
violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious or social goal through fear, 
coercion, or intimidation.” Using this definition, I also define terrorist organizations as those who 
form together within a state and use violence in order to achieve their respective group goals 
(Phillips 2014).  
The Causal Mechanisms of Terrorism 
Classic explanations of terrorism have typically focused on the environment that surrounds the 
organization. These explanations, called structural theories “posit that the causes of terrorism can 
be found in the environment and the political, cultural, social, and economic structure of 
societies” (Ross 1993, 317).  These accounts vary widely; Crenshaw (1981) notes familiar 
economic and political conditions as well as more abstract concepts such as “modernization” and 
“facilitation” playing a role in the occurrence of terrorism.   
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The most prevalent structural explanation for terrorism is a country’s regime type.  Li (2005) 
discusses three explanations for the relationship between regime type and terrorism. The first 
explanation examines how there are various facets of a democracy that reduce terrorism. For 
Crenshaw (1981), this essentially means that in some states, there is an insufficient number of 
opportunities available for individuals to participate in government.  This lack of opportunities 
leads to terrorism.  In other words, this means that non-democratic countries are likely to see 
more terrorism due to their public’s inability to register their anger in other, more peaceful, ways.  
Democratic countries, on the other hand, will see less terrorism.  Any disagreement that the 
public will have with the government will be handled through the ballot box, rather than through 
violence.     
It is important to note that democracy is not the good thing that it is often assumed to be.  
Crenshaw (1981, 384) notes that much of the then-modern terrorism that she was familiar with 
was a response to discontent with democracy, “many terrorists today are young, well-educated, 
and middle class in background. Such students or young professionals, with no prior political 
experience, are disillusioned with the prospects of changing society and see little chance of access 
to the system despite their privileged status.”  
A second relationship between regime type and terrorism is that democratic countries are likely to 
experience more terrorism than non-democracies.  This occurs because democracies respect 
citizens’ civil liberties.  This allows terrorist organizations the space to plan and conduct 
operations without government interference.  Schmid (1992) finds that civil liberties that are 
guaranteed as well as widespread increases the difficulty for the state’s legal system to reprimand 
and convict terrorists as well as pursue perpetrators.  This should lead to increased levels of 
terrorist violence.  
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The third perspective regarding regime type is that attributes of democracy can work at cross-
purposes; voting decreases terrorism while respect for civil liberties increases it (Li 2005).  
Institutional characteristics also have an impact; Reynal-Querol (2002) find that proportional 
systems tend to reduce the chance of terrorism compared to majoritarian systems.  This occurs 
because “groups are significantly less likely to emerge in democracies that have a proportional 
representation system and higher levels of district magnitude” (Aksoy and Carter 2012, 181). By 
establishing the proportional representation system, there is more opportunity for individuals to 
participate in the democratic process.  In majoritarian systems however, democracies will still 
experience terrorist groups more than other systems which still aligns with the second 
relationship mentioned earlier. 
A state’s economics provides the second common structural theory for terrorism.  Most simply, 
poor economic conditions may serve as proxy for feelings of dissatisfaction and inequality, which 
may lead to violence (Gurr 1970). This suggests that poor economics provides the reason why 
people will take action to address those responsible for their unequal position.  Another linkage 
between economics and terrorism may simply be that terrorism pays.  Becker’s (1968) model of 
crime suggested that participation in crime increases when the payoffs associated with crime are 
greater than those from legal employment.  Participation in terrorism may then be way for 
disadvantaged people to subsist.   
At the individual level, these theories have not been supported.  Krueger and Maleckova (2003) 
find that there is little to no connection between the education level and poverty rates with the 
rate of participation in terrorist organizations. This suggests that there may be other explanations 
for why individuals join these groups that cannot be explained with economics.  Broader country-
level work, has also not been supportive.  In one early study on the effects of economics on 
terrorism, Abadie (2005) found no relationship between a country’s per-capita income and its risk 
of experiencing terrorism.  Instead, terrorism was influenced by the state’s level of political 
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freedom.  A study by Piazza (2006) tested a broader range of variables, including GINI scores, 
the Human Development Indicator, and GDP and also found no relationship between economics 
and terrorism. Piazza (2006) also found political explanations to be the strongest; terrorism is due 
to the weakness of a state’s party system and its social cleavages. One exception may be 
Burgoon’s (2006) work.  He finds that a state’s level of welfare was negatively related with its 
risk of terrorism. This suggests that there may be some other influencing factor that play a role in 
a state’s risk of terrorism that is not considered in the current terrorism literature.  
Structural explanations may not always serve to explain the occurrence of terrorism.  Crenshaw’s 
(1981) category of precipitants provide for more specific and idiosyncratic causes of violence.  
This category essentially consists of a state’s use of repression. However, not every state that has 
used repression has experienced terrorism as a result nor has every state that has not used 
repression not faced terrorism.  
The Study of Terrorist Groups 
In many cases, structural theories are of limited use.  Many times, terrorism is the result of the 
grievances of a small minority, rather than broad societal grievances (Crenshaw 1981).  This 
means that we need to look at more specific, organizational, explanations for terrorism (Crenshaw 
1985; Oots 1986, 1989).  It is important to look at how groups behave as well as how they endure. 
This study’s focus on group behavior will allow me to highlight a facet, culture, which is not 
commonly in the terrorism literature.  I believe that culture can explain why some groups survive 
longer than others.   
Strategic Model 
The strategic model for group behavior assumes that organizations abide by the tenets of rational 
choice.  This means that individuals within the organization, “(1) possess stable and consistent 
preferences; (2) they compare the costs and benefits of all available options; and (3) select the 
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optimal option, that is, the one that maximizes output” (Abrahms 2008, 80).  This results in 
organizations that have goals that remain fairly constant, commit acts of terrorism when no other 
alternative seems viable, and use terrorism because it is sometimes the most fruitful course of 
action. A strategic model of longevity would assume that an organization endures in so far that it 
provides benefits to its members that exceeds the costs of membership (Berman 2009).   
Vittori (2009) examines how terrorist groups are able to stay active despite economic constraints. 
She finds that ideology of the group plays a role in duration of the organization. Terrorist groups 
must also be able to generate money, resources, and bring in recruits (Napoleoni 2004). These 
resources offset the costs that members face for being a terrorist.  Kiser (2005, 30) discusses how 
terrorist groups finance their organization by having a “sophisticated terrorist network” consisting 
of various individuals who bring different levels of expertise to the organization.  This means that 
groups have a variety of individuals who specialize in various areas who can support the 
operations of the organization. Using this, the organization can identify the best places to have 
members contribute in order to best realize their goal.  
Economics also makes recruitment important for group survival, as it helps bring in new 
operatives to replace ones that have quit, been killed, or arrested.  According to Vittori (2009, 
445) “large, modern terrorist groups are complex entities that adopt advanced organizational 
models; they must utilize functional differentiation and recruit and retain members with 
specialized skills if they want to survive” (2009, 445). This idea that terrorist groups rely on 
recruitment to maintain their ability to stay afloat coincides with Brunsson’s (1985) research. He 
argues that individuals in organizations transform their responsibilities to help keep the 
organization operational. This suggests that terrorist groups restructure individual roles 
accordingly in order to remain active longer.  
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Regime type is another factor used to examine the longevity of these organizations. Diamond 
(1999) finds that democratization affects a group’s ability to remain active. Basic freedoms, 
political transparency and the rule of law provide an environment for groups to remain active 
(Diamond 1999). These factors allow groups to remain present as well as it makes them more 
active because of the lack of civil constraints.  Similarly, Vittori (2009) notes that terrorist groups 
last longer in democratic states because of the ability for groups enjoy certain civil rights such as 
freedom to assemble and protest. The work of Fleurke and Willemse (2006) confirms this. They 
find that terrorist groups in non-democratic states have shorter lifespans. This is because non-
democratic states have more repressive regimes that limit the ability of groups to act freely within 
the state. 
In sum, the strategic model for terrorist group longevity, suggests that groups endure so long as 
the environment is favorable to the group. These environmental factors include, economic 
considerations and political constraints; however, this model does not account for other factors 
such as culture. Because of this, the strategic model does not take a holistic approach to all the 
facets that affect the a group’s longevity. Therefore, it is not a good explanation for group 
duration. The working and social relationship between members of the organization can influence 
whether or not individuals decide to remain in a group. These social interactions, which I will 
discuss later in the theory section, are influenced by culture which provides insight on how these 
varying group behaviors can influence the duration of groups.  
Natural Systems Model 
An alternative to the strategic model is the natural system model (Barnard 1939). According to 
Barnard (1939, 145) “individuals engage in a cost benefit analysis of whether to participate in an 
organization based on its personal inducements, which have little if any connection to the 
organization's stated goals.” This means that individuals decide whether to be a part of a group on 
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the basis of how it will personally benefit them. The factors that are important to members then, 
are social networks, familiar ties, and personal affinity to other members of the organization.  
The natural systems model has been used to explain the behavior of individuals within 
organizations. According to Scott and Davis (2007), there are two varying themes that can be 
seen in the goal of the organizations in a natural system. First, the stated goals and the “real” goal 
often do not perfectly align with one another. This is important because we cannot use the stated 
goal of the group as an explanation for its behavior (Scott and Davis 2007). This is also seen in 
their second theme. In this case, group behavior is also likely to vary from the stated goals of the 
organization; this occurs because there are outside goals that govern individual’s behavior within 
the organization (Scott and Davis 2007).  
Scholars that adopt the natural systems model argue that other approaches too often treat all 
organizations as the same (Coving and Kling 1996; Stubbs and Cocklin 2008). This, according to 
many theorists distorts the true goals and nature of organizations. In other words, the strategic 
model – because it treats all organizations the same – may not be a good explanation for 
organizational behavior. 
For Abrahms (2008), the various puzzles regarding terrorist activities such as the lack of 
compromise, anonymous attacks, and terrorist fratricide was best explained by referring to the 
natural systems model.  Terrorists, rather than joining and staying in the organization because it 
fulfills some political objective, are part of the organization because they have, or hope to have, 
strong bonds with other members of the organization. This mirrors the idea that, in some 
instances, organizations will focus on surviving to the point that this preservation becomes the 
main goal of the group (Gouldner 1959; Wilson 1974).  This activity is contrary to strategic 
assumptions. As for group longevity, the natural systems theory is more applicable because it 
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implies that groups change over time. The theory takes into consideration these groups change 
due to outside influence; therefore, individual behavior adjusts accordingly.  
The Link Between “Normal” and “Terrorist” organizations 
While not common practice, equating the behaviors between “normal” and “terrorist” 
organizations can be insightful in regard to group behavior. Brannan et al (2001) find that there is 
a normative preconceived judgment in studying terrorism and they state that the term “terrorist” 
itself “encompasses an enormous and highly disparate collection of groups and individuals, 
ranging from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine to Theodore Kazcynski. Simply 
categorizing them as “terrorists” does not make them remotely similar or even qualitatively or 
quantitatively comparable” (19). With this in mind, it can be beneficial to examine terrorist 
organizations as legitimate organizations, regardless of their violent behavior. By equating them 
to legitimate businesses, the field of terrorism research can then branch out into other academic 
fields and apply their models and frameworks to examine the operational behaviors of terrorist 
groups.   
Zelinksy and Shubik (2009) created a centralization model that examined the resources and 
operations of business and applied this model to terrorist groups in order to illustrate the 
similarity between the two. By doing this they applied four different business operation models to 
examine various terrorist organizations. These business models are Hierarchy, Venture Capital, 
Franchise and Brand. 2 Each of these categories have characteristics that define the operational 
behavior within legitimate organizations. In regard to terrorist groups they found groups such as 
Hezbollah and the IRA to align with the hierarchy business model in that that these groups like 
other business have the ability to implement long-term projects such as training camps (training 
                                                             
2 Descriptions of the four business models can be found in Zelinsky and Shubki (2009) Research Note: 
Terrorist Groups as Business Firms: A New Typological Framework pages 329-330.   
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institutes/workshops for legitimate businesses). By examining terrorist groups through a different 
lens, a new approach can be taken when studying the operational behavior of these groups. 
Separating these groups as different from other organizations would present the challenge of 
measuring the difference, thus Zelinsky and Shubik provided a model that allows for the safe 
assumption that operationally, regardless of the goals, terrorist organizations are similar to other 
businesses. Now because we are examining them as parallel to other organizations, the 
relationship can be drawn between these groups and culture as defined later on in the theory 
section of this study.  
Defining Culture 
First and foremost, culture is a complicated term to define. Edward Tylor (1871, 16) described it 
as “that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other 
capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society”. While his definition is a 
common one, his is not the only well-known one.  This occurs because culture is dependent upon 
the context of the observer. Humanist and poet Matthew Arnold (1869) referred to culture as the 
“human refinement of ideas” (Arnold 1869).  
Secondly, academic definitions are affected by the scholar’s predispositions.  Sociologists and 
anthropologists tend to view the construct of culture differently; Sociologist George Simmel 
viewed culture as “the cultivation of individuals through the agency of external forms which have 
been objectified in the course of history” Levine’s (1971, 6).  Anthropologist Franz Boas believed 
culture was based on the “lenses” in which individuals view their respective countries (Liron 
2003).  The sociologist’s definition of culture insists that it is formed by history, while 
anthropologist’s perspective see culture as something that is continually crafted by the individuals 
within society.  
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Despite these disagreements, there is some commonality.  Across academia, culture is largely 
agreed upon to involve groups of people and their customs, beliefs, values, and their respective 
behaviors (O’Reilly 1989).  Further, culture is learned; it is not a genetic predisposition that one 
inherits (Axelrod 1997). It cannot be passed down from parents to children and it is not exclusive 
to one individual.  Instead, it is a group of shared beliefs and values held by the community or 
group of people (Hall 1976).  With this understanding, it can be assumed that culture affects the 
everyday operations of groups within a society.  These operations include interaction among 
family members, strangers, as well as behavior within in small and large group settings (Kroeber 
and Kluckhohn 1952).     
To this end, I use Brumann’s (1999, 40) definition of culture; it is “the forms of traditional 
behaviour which are characteristic of a given society or of a group of societies, or of a certain 
race, or of a certain area, or of a certain period of time.”   
Culture as a Determinant for Organizational Longevity 
While the natural systems model provides the best explanation for why groups endure, the 
rationale for why people stay within organizations, often at great cost, differs across society.  A 
society’s culture determines the value that groups place on social interactions.  Culture has an 
impact on individuals within an organization in regard to their behavior, beliefs, and attitudes 
(Martin, 1992). Additionally, Schein (1990) finds that even though there are various types of 
groups within a state, the norms of that state influence the behaviours of these groups.  
Schien (1996, 3) defines organizational culture as “the basic tacit assumptions about how the 
world is and ought to be that a group of people share and that determines their perceptions, 
thoughts, feelings, and, their overt behavior.”. He also believes that culture cannot necessarily be 
categorized in its entirety and instead, can only be categorized in part. Additionally, in order to 
understand organization behavior, Schein (1990) believes that culture is crucial to developing a 
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full understanding of organizations, because of its power to essentially determine whether or not 
an organization is successful and last long versus one that falls apart.  
Culture according to Schein (1990) can be categorized in three levels. The first level “artifacts”, 
explores the visual structure and processes that can be identified, but not always understood.  
These are the aspects of culture that we can physically see such as the way a person act, talks or 
carries themselves.  Secondly, are “espoused values.” These are essentially the goals, strategies, 
and philosophies of the culture. This aspect of culture explores the collective unit of culture, 
where people pass down their beliefs and traditions down through generations.  Lastly, the “basic 
assumptions and values” are the center of the culture according to Schein (1990).  These, he 
believes, are essentially the deepest dimension of humanity and guide our relationships, truth and 
reality. These are the subconscious parts of culture that controls how individuals perceive society 
and how they react to change.   
This is further illustrated by Straub et al (2002), whom find that cultural “layers” affect the 
interactions between individuals within a group.  Their study finds that culture is not a one-
dimensional concept and is instead, the result of multiple facets such as ethnic, national, religious 
and even organizational ones. Their research found that these layers, do in fact contribute to the 
success of groups, resulting in the groups lasting longer in their respective areas.  
The Relationship between Culture and Terrorism 
Evaluating culture’s impact on terrorism is difficult.  The lack of an appropriate and precise 
definition of culture runs the very real risk of having the researcher rerun previously completed 
research.  If culture is a shorthand for religion, previous work exists looking at the relationship 
(Rapoport 1984; Hoffman 1995; Piazza 2009).  If culture means country-level studies, that too 
has been done (Freytag et al. 2011; Feilich et al 2015; LaFree and Bersani 2014; Chatterjee and 
Abkowitz 2011).  This study explored the connection between country determinants such as 
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economic development, and the rate of terrorism. Or, if culture means ethnicity, work like this 
has also already been done (Vanhanen 1999; Basuchoudhary and Shugart 2010).   
Although I reference these above, I want to discuss some previous work on “culture” and 
terrorism.  One of the most common of these types of studies are those seeking to examine the 
link between religion and terrorism.  Rapoport (1984) explicates three religious traditions to 
explore the connection between religion and terrorism. The Thugs of India engaged in ritual 
killings of seemingly random civilians in order to please their god. While they did mean to bring 
terror to specific individuals, the widespread fear that was generated, was unintended. The 
Assassins of the medieval Middle East, on the other hand, had political goals as opposed to the 
purely religious goals of the former group (Rapoport 1984). The third group, the Zealots (or 
Sicarii), aimed to induce mass uprisings in Judea in order to achieve their goal of casting off 
Roman occupation. The Zealots were carrying out, what they perceived to be the word of the God 
and doing so in a way that sparked a slew of killings. 
Juergensmeyer (2000) also explored the differences among religions and the respective beliefs 
regarding terrorism. Specifically, his study illustrated the difference between particular religions 
and what each viewed as morally acceptable and what others deemed to be inhumane and terrorist 
in nature.  More recently, Piazza (2009) assesses the role of radical Islam on terrorism.  He finds 
that Islamic terrorism is not any more dangerous than other terrorist group ideologies and other 
ideologies such as nationalism or political occur at about the same rate as religious ideologies. 
A second, and closely related concern, is that studies of the relationship between culture and 
terrorism can appear to be done to advance a particular – and odious - agenda.  Specifically, this 
type of research could be used – if done improperly – to argue the superiority of one culture, 
religion, race, or other difference over that of another group.  This type of work is, unfortunately, 
far too real. Mahmood Mamdani’s (2002) work Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: A Political 
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Perspective on Culture and Terrorism can be considered an aggressive attempt to pit two cultures 
against each other using charged language such as the statement “Even a political child knows the 
answer to Bush's incredulous question, "Why do they hate us?" When it comes to the Middle 
East, we all know that the United States stands for cheap oil and not free speech” (Mamdani 
2002, 773).  Another example can be seen in Patrick Porter’s (2007, 53) work where he examines 
the U.S. attacks post-Pearl Harbor and states “Japan had the “victory disease. It was a victim of 
its own previous successes against China and Russia and the rapid conquests in Asia” and the use 
of his verbiage can be taken as condescending making Japan seem as if they are too arrogant. 
Aside from it being simply bad science, this problem, and the outcry it attracts, is a reason why 
academics shy away from studying the two together.  
Culture defines a state and people define culture. Social norms are set and people in those 
communities in more cases than not, fall in line with those norms; therefore, these individuals 
within these terrorists and or insurgent groups have the same cultural foundation as everyone else 
in their respective states that are a part of various organizations and or businesses. I provide in 
depth analysis of the political and economic structural variables in the study of terrorist groups in 
order to highlight the lack of cultural analysis. While culture is distinctly different than the 
political and economic implications, there is overlap in regard to the interaction amongst groups 
within these various economic and political systems. I discuss later in the theory section various 
dimensions that are used in this study, which mirror some of the political behaviors mentioned in 
the literature review. For example, participation in democratic process can be reflected in the 
power distance dimension. However, culture captures something distinct between states that is 
not easily quantified by political or economic variables. By examining this missing piece to the 
current literature, a better connection can be formed in order to see how culture interacts with the 
relationships between terrorism and the political and economic variables.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
THEORY 
 
 
For this study, I will be using the theoretical framework developed by Hofstede (1983).  I use this 
theory because it offers a way to examine terrorist group behavior on a cultural level.  and it does 
not reference particular races, religions, or ethnicity.  Rather, state cultures are operationalized 
using six concepts (Hofstede (1983) calls them dimensions).  Given that organizations within 
states are largely comprised of people from that state, we can assume that these attributes affect 
organizations too.  Further, given that terrorist organizations share many commonalities with their 
peaceful counterparts, we can assume that these cultural dimensions that affect “normal” 
organizations will also affect the longevity of terrorist organizations.     
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National Culture and Organizational Behavior 
Culture impacts organizational culture in many ways. A state’s culture influences facets of group 
behavior such as motivation, conflict resolution, organizational change and even communication. 
These influences in turn, heavily impact the behavior and culture of organizations (Treven and 
Treven 2007). By understanding how a state’s culture affects the various facets of group 
behavior, a better understanding can be drawn in order to see the link between national culture 
and organizational culture. Treven, Mulej and Lynn (2008) found that a state's cultural norms, in 
regard to motivation, mirrored the motivation behaviors within organizations. They used Japan as 
an example and found that motivation through physical incentives or rewards was de-motivating 
to the population due to the collectivistic nature of the state. When examining organizations, they 
found an identical response. Their research finds the opposite in Slovenia and Croatia; motivating 
incentives within organizations mirrored the motivating behaviors amongst the larger Slovene 
and Croat population.  
Gundykunst and Ting-Toomy (1988) examined how national culture impacts the conflict 
resolution behaviors within organizations and found a strong connection between the two. This 
research used Edward Hall’s (1976) model of high-context and low-context cultures. He defined a 
state as either high-context or low-context and explicated the differences by the way people 
within the state interacted in regard to verbal and non-verbal communication. Using his model, 
Gundykunst and Ting-Toomey (1988) essentially found that organizational behavior in regard to 
conflict resolution was parallel to the state’s classification as high context or low context. For 
example, they found that organizations within a high context culture mirrored the behavior of 
resorting to either non-verbal or non-confrontational communication in order to resolve disputes. 
States with national cultures classified as low-context had organizations that paralleled the state’s 
culture in their explicitness in communication and confrontational behavior. There have been 
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multiple other studies that found a strong link between state culture and organizational culture 
(Brislin 1993; Samovar and Porter 1991; Abbasi and Holman 1993).  
It is important to understand how national culture and organizational culture complement each 
other when examining how culture may affect groups. Hofstede (1985) finds that national culture 
is centered on deeply rooted values. These range from what the respective cultures see as good or 
evil, safe or dangerous, as well as what is considered rational or irrational. National culture 
according to Hofstede (1985) is something that is learned in the early stages of life. Because of 
this early cultural influence, changing these beliefs are often slow and significantly complicated. 
As for organizational culture, Hofstede (1985) maintains that an organization’s culture stems 
from the national culture. The organizational culture mirrors the culture of the state and, like the 
state, is difficult to change (Hofstede 1985). Because of this, organizational culture has many 
similarities that can be seen in a state’s culture.  
 
History of Hofstede’s Model 
Hofstede’s (1983) model – called the cultural dimensions theory – examines the cultural behavior 
of groups within a state. This model was initially created from a survey used in research for IBM 
in 1985. Hofstede surveyed multiple organizations and businesses within a state in order to see 
how individual groups influenced a state’s marketplace. This was used to explain why IBM and 
its subsidiaries had varying organizational cultures based on where they were located.  The 
survey responses of all the organizations in a state were average order to create a profile for that 
state (See Appendix Figures 1 - 6). By doing this, he was able to identify the strength of each 
cultural dimension in a state.  The six variables of the profile were then used to help establish a 
baseline to determine the likelihood that an organization would fail.   
24 
 
There have been various studies that have utilized Hofstede’s (1983) dimensions to explain group 
behavior.  Wood and Wilberger (2015) examine the relationship between the cultural dimensions 
and the success of multinational corporations. They find that when corporations fail, it is due to 
differences in organizational culture. Specifically, when groups lack the ability to communicate 
and understand one another the goal of the organization can be attained due to these issues.  
Additionally, Bakir et al. (2014) study the challenges that organizations face when operating in 
more than one country, thus creating conflicting viewpoints among groups with different cultural 
traits. They find that groups from cultures that are on either side of the dimension (i.e. one person 
from a masculine state versus a person from a feminine state) will have opposing views and 
compromise amongst them can be difficult at times.  When there is a lack of compromise within 
these groups, they run the risk of dying off, because of the lack of cooperation.       
Helmreich and Merritt (2001) and Eisend et al (2015) studied how culture plays a role in a 
group’s duration. They find that groups that have more cooperation amongst its members – due to 
similar cultural values - will have a longer duration than those that do not have cooperation. 
Essentially, when individuals who make up the group have the same cultural characteristics, the 
group is able to function more efficiently and last longer. 
While terrorist organizations are illegal, a case has been made that they are very similar to their 
peaceful counterparts.  Oots (1989) likens terrorist groups to political parties which means that 
we can use the concepts originally found for the inception, recruitment, operations, and decline of 
these organizations to terrorist groups. Their core organizational behaviors are virtually 
equivalent to normal organizations, with the difference being mainly the ways these organizations 
attempt to realize their goals (Crenshaw 1985; Oots 1989).   
 Although terrorist organizations look very different from groups that are not, the role of culture 
is still likely to be very important.  As a result, Hofstede’s (1983) insights are likely to be of value 
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here too.  Below, I discuss each of Hofstede’s (1983 six dimensions and how they may impact the 
duration of terrorist organizations.  While these dimensions measure different facets of culture, 
they are relative and in order to use them effectively, they must be done so comparatively.  
Power Distance 
Power distance, according to Hofstede (2011), explores how power is distributed and how this 
distribution is accepted by lower-tier members of the society.  The lower-tier populations of a 
state include the poor as well as its minority populations. Countries that are low in this measure, 
having little power distance, tend to favor equality and do not align with strict hierarchal 
structures, meaning they do not have defined “positions” within society.  This, most importantly, 
means that in these states the ability to question authority figures is seen as appropriate. There 
also tends to be a free flow of information between groups, thus resulting in a more “free” state.  
Governmental procedures tend to utilize majority-vote models and political changes are peaceful 
and accepted by the state as a whole. 
States that have high power distance refer to those who have strict hierarchal structures that create 
defined differences between the groups in society. For example, there is high political inequality 
in Mexico, which benefits the elite minority and these differences are not challenged and instead 
accepted (Robertson 2004).  In other words, the political elite come predominately from the 
Mexican upper class, who control policy to keep this inequality in place, and the rest of the 
country is largely acceptant of this dynamic (Robertson 2004).   The governments in these states 
are also likely to experience more graft and corruption because there are fewer norms regarding 
checks and balances (Mauro 1995). 
In organizations, power distance is important because it illustrates the way leaders and 
subordinates communicate and interact amongst each other. Groups exhibiting high power 
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distance are made up of groups who obey leadership without hesitation. Essentially the 
individuals in leadership roles have unwavering decision-making power and the subordinates 
accept this difference in power (Hofstede 2010). As for low power distance, it is expected for 
subordinates to have a say in the operations of the organization, resembling a more equal 
distribution of power. These groups work by superiors and subordinates negotiating during 
decision making and the distance between them is relatively small (Xiaomei 2016; Podrug et al 
2006; Mahbub 2017).  
Assuming that terrorist organizations are the similar to other organizations (see Crenshaw 1985) – 
except for the means they use – terrorist groups in this sense can be akin to organizations in 
respect to cultural behaviors. Increasing power distance means defined roles are established 
between leader and subordinates. A side benefit of increasing power distance may be increased 
security for the organization (Shapiro 2013).  As the power distance of a terrorist group increases, 
the influence on operations by subordinates decrease. The implications this dimension has on 
group success (longevity for the sake of this study) lies within the dimension’s influence on group 
cooperation among the leaders and the lower-tier members of the organization. With defined 
hierarchal roles, individuals within a high-power distance group understand their responsibilities 
and carry them out without questioning authority while groups in lower power distance have the 
opportunity to combat with their leaders. These differences equate to whether or not opposition is 
found in group behavior which can potentially lead to a group dying off faster, thus I predict: 
H1: Changes in a  state’s power distance will have an effect on the duration of a terrorist group. 
Uncertainty Avoidance  
Uncertainty avoidance can be defined as “the extent to which the members of a culture feel 
threatened by ambiguous or unknown situations” (Hofstede 2010, 10). Another way of viewing 
the uncertainty avoidance dimension is to think of the ideas traditionalism versus progressivism. 
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States that have high uncertainty avoidance are more traditional in a sense that there is little desire 
to change customs and practices. On the other hand, states low on uncertainty avoidance are not 
as bound to past practices and are more acceptant of changing these.  These opposing viewpoints 
on these unclear situations can affect the state’s ability to adapt and change accordingly with the 
international community (Kashima 1998). 
In organizations, uncertainty avoidance is important because it illustrates the way members 
within the group react to change (Hofstede 2010). Groups exhibiting high uncertainty avoidance 
are made up of individuals who prefer to refrain from change in operations and rather maintain 
the traditional way of going about their responsibilities. (Hofstede 2010). As for low uncertainty 
avoidance, it is expected that individuals within the group will be more open to new practices and 
ways of conducting business.   These groups work by members seeking out new and innovative 
ways to operate as a unit in preparation of the evolving marketplace in which they do business 
(Bellot 2011; Joseph 2009).  By doing this, groups are able to stay up to date and maintain active 
operations in the marketplace, thus increasing their longevity.  
As for the behavior of terrorist groups, they are essentially the same as those in other 
organizations when looking at uncertainty avoidance.  The Irish Republican Army can be said to 
have had low uncertainty avoidance, as it was willing to embrace new tactics and new operations 
in light of changes in its environment (Jackson 2005). In fact, according to Jackson (2005, 97) 
“Initially, the principal military activity of the IRA was stone-throwing and sometimes petrol 
bombing. But as weapons became more available and the group evolved,  IRA’s repertoire 
expanded; within months, it included firearms and it progressed toward what would eventually 
become significant explosives expertise.” This may have contributed to the organization’s 
longevity.  This is likely to be reversed for groups with low uncertainty avoidance.  In these 
cases, the group’s willingness to try new tactics is likely to increase their longevity. The 
implications this dimension has on group longevity lies within the dimension’s influence on 
28 
 
group members’ adaptability in the marketplace. Maintaining consistent operations, groups within 
a high UAI culture have outdated methods of conducting business, thus I predict: 
H2: Changes in a  state’s uncertainty avoidance will have an effect on the duration of a terrorist 
group. 
Masculinity  
The masculinity dimension refers to when:  
“emotional gender roles are clearly distinct—men are supposed to be assertive, tough and focused 
on material success, women are supposed to be more modest, tender and concerned with the 
quality of life. A society is called feminine when emotional gender roles overlap—both men and 
women are supposed to be modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life” (Hofstede 
2010, 140).  
This dimension looks at how gender roles influence the cultural behavior of the state. Masculine 
states such as the United States are found to be more aggressive in social settings whereas states 
such as Bhutan are less so due to both cultures having gender influences that shape the way 
groups interact amongst one another (Thowfeek and Jaafar 2012).  Krug et al (1998) country level 
analysis on crime rates, illustrated that crime rates are higher in states that are labeled masculine 
via Hofstede’s model, which indicate that masculine states may have the tendency to exert 
physical violence in comparison to feminine state.    
In organizations, masculinity is important because it illustrates the way members within the group 
act when completing assigned tasks (Lamoreaux and Marling 2012). Groups within masculine 
cultures carry out tasks in a more direct and aggressive manner.  Groups exhibiting high 
masculinity are made up of individuals who are competitive in nature, and work well 
independently due to their one-way communication style (Parrish 2010). Essentially the 
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individuals in these organizations are assertive in interaction with one another and aim for 
personal gratification and not so much the gratification of other members in the organization. 
(Hofstede 2010 and Karber 1971).  In more feminine groups, those with low masculinity,  it is 
expected that groups aim to cooperate in order to promote a positive environment (Hofstede 
2010). These groups are made up of individuals who are more modest in regard to self-
recognition. These groups work by members seeking harmony when working amongst one 
another through two-way communication (Lamoreaux and Marling 2012; Taras, Kirkman, and 
Steel 2010; Parrish 2010). Groups who operate in way that resembles feminine states are better at 
maintaining relevancy and staying up to date within the marketplace, thus allowing them to last 
longer.  
I believe that as the masculinity of a terrorist group increases, the influence on the group’s 
willingness to cooperate with one another decreases.  Cooperation is important for the survival of 
terrorist organizations because in order for these groups to work, members must be able to 
operate on one accord Cherney and Murphy 2013; Criss and Cetiner 2000). When there is a 
divide among members, operations become inefficient resulting in the group dismantling. 
Organized groups, whom work with clear communications, understand their roles in the groups 
and work as a team, last longer (Shelly 2003) The traits of feminine groups are the ones that 
allow groups to last longer because they encourage communication and growth among members  
(Shelly 2003). Maintaining masculine behavior can lead to less cooperation amongst members in 
the group, therefore I predict:  
H3: Changes in a  state’s masculinity will have an effect on the duration of a terrorist group. 
Restraint  
Restraint measures the cultural tendency for an individual to seek gratification versus demonstrate 
restraint.  Hofstede (2010, 281) states:  
30 
 
Indulgence stands for a tendency to allow relatively free gratification of basic and natural human 
desires related to enjoying life and having fun. Its opposite pole, restraint, reflects a conviction 
that such gratification needs to be curbed and regulated by strict social norms.  
States at the high end of this dimension are those who are more restrained in behavior. These 
states practice self-control, maintaining a “need” only way of operating. These states are typically 
consisted of groups who are very frugal and limit the number of extraneous niceties, whereas on 
the other end, states who have low-restraint are much more self-indulgent. These states follow a 
more “want” based decision making process and are no stranger to self-indulgence.    
For organizations, restraint is important because it reveals whether members are self- or other-
seeking. Groups with high restraint scores consist of individuals who practice self-restraint and do 
not let their personal goals cloud their business responsibilities. These groups stay steadfast in 
maintaining professionalism and keeping the mission of the organization on the forefront of the 
professional job duties. When examining found that individuals who work within an organization 
that have high levels of professional efficacy, tend to remove their own personal desires.  (Gist 
1987; Bandura and Cervone 1984). Group with low restraint scores are more likely to seek self-
gratification. Essentially this means that these groups allow their personal goals influence their 
professional behavior. These personal goals sometimes align with the organizational goals; 
therefore, groups are more willing to let themselves pursue personal gain within an organization 
(Misho 2010; Schimmack et al 2002).  
Terrorist groups are likely to look the same way.  It can be understood that terrorist groups consist 
of individuals who can choose to put aside their own goals and pursue organizational goals or as 
well as those who seek to pursue their own goals separate from the organization’s.  This can be 
seen with the principal-agent problem (Lundahl 2004). Members that seek to achieve their own 
goals are likely to negatively affect the group since they are more likely to disobey the 
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organization or turn on the organization if given the right opportunity. The military coup in 
Pakistan in 1999 is an example of where General Musharraf decided to go against the government 
after the Kargil war (Bahadur 2001).  People that put the organization’s goals first are likely to 
benefit the organization, causing it to last longer.  As a result, I predict: 
H4: Changes in a  state’s restraint  will have an effect on the duration of a terrorist group. 
Long-Term Orientation 
Hofstede’s (2010) long-term orientation dimension refers to the “fostering of virtues oriented 
toward future rewards—in particular, perseverance and thrift. Its opposite pole, short-term 
orientation, stands for the fostering of virtues related to—fulfilling social obligations” (239). 
These differences essentially indicate the preparation and decision-making culture of a state, such 
as the long-term outlook of China, which can be seen in the state’s cultural practices. For an 
example, groups in China intensely plan ahead, and base their actions on the desire to maintain a 
stable quality of life in the future (Chan 1999). These individuals are more likely to make 
financial decision in preparation for monetary obligations they may have in the future. In short-
term states, groups are more likely to make financial decisions that impact their lives currently, 
thus they are less likely to be financially mindful.   
In organizations, long-term orientation is important because it illustrates what members of an 
organization believe to be most important.   Groups exhibiting high values in this dimension  are 
made up of individuals who prefer to pursue tasks that are going to prepare the organization for 
future business ventures. Essentially these groups have contingencies set in place for when 
obstacles or opportunities may present themselves (Lee and Dawes 2001).  Alcantara-Pilar and 
Barrio-García (2015) looked at how groups in Spain vs the United Kingdom and discovered that 
groups in Long-term oriented groups were better at predicting and preventing problems, whereas 
Short-term oriented groups were better at addressing and resolving current problems.  As for low 
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values of this dimension, these groups will only address current business endeavors and 
environments. These groups work by identifying potential challenges and figuring out how to 
successfully handle them in order to active in the marketplace (Nisbett 2003; Miyamoto et al 
2006; Parrish and Linder-Vanberschot 2010). 
As for the long-term orientation of terrorist organizations, I believe that this will parallel other 
types of groups.  As groups become more long-term oriented, groups tend to task themselves with 
making decisions that will prepare themselves for any future changes in their respective 
environments, allowing them to be prepared for virtually anything.  Looking at the Italian group 
Anti-Imperialist Territorial Nuclei for the Construction of the Fighting Communist Party, a group 
that is in a fairly Long-Term oriented county, it can be assumed that their planning ahead 
practices keep them alive (Jones and Libicki 2008; Hofstede 1983).  Because of this, I predict: 
H5: Changes in a  state’s long-term orientation will have an effect on the duration of a terrorist 
group.  
Individualism 
Individualism, according to Hofstede (2010, 11): 
pertains to societies in which the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look 
after him- or herself and his or her immediate family. Collectivism as its opposite pertains to 
societies in which people from birth onward are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, which 
throughout people’s lifetime continue to protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty. 
Individualistic states are made up of groups whom have a more “I” or “me” attitude which 
essentially means they focus on themselves while collectivistic states have a more “we” mentality 
(Hofstede 1985) Western and developed countries such as the Canada and Denmark tend to be 
more individualistic whereas less developed countries such as Venezuela and Ethiopia are more 
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collectivist (Hofstede 2011; Triandis et al 1988). Having a more individualistic culture makes a 
state much more competitive due to the groups within the state caring about achievement and 
success. On the other end, collectivism traits, makes a state more so concerned about internal 
problems because they care more so about the interworking’s of their society (Markus & 
Kitayama 1991; Triandis 1990). 
 In organizations, individualism is important because it identifies whether groups use a teamwork 
or independent work styles (Bond 1986). Groups exhibiting high levels of individualism consist  
of people  who prefer to work alone  and are driven by their individual success (Hofstede 1985).  
This in turn is not good for the group because when there is a lack of teamwork there is also a 
lack of progression for the entire organization. (Jaspars and Hewstone 1982).  With low 
individualism, it is expected that people within the group prefer to work as a unit and promote the 
success of the group over their own.   success of oneself (Schimmack, Oishi, and Diener, 2005; 
Oyserman and Lee (2008; Faitar 2006).  Compared to individualistic groups, collectivistic groups 
have the advantage of being able to capitalize on team work extending the duration of the group. 
(Bochney and Hesketh 1994).    
I believe that, as a terrorist group becomes more individualistic, it will have shorter duration.  
This occurs because the goal is no longer “we” and has now shifted to a more “I” perspective 
(Hofstede 2011). For example, the Latvian group Waffen SS lasted for less than a year, and they 
are located in a state that is fairly individualistic (Jones and Libicki 2008; Hofstede 1983).  The 
implications this dimension has on group longevity lies with the group’s ability to come together 
in a way that promotes and maintains consistent operations.  Groups in collectivist cultures such 
as the Kabataang Makabayan, a group in the Philippines, which is considered a collectivistic 
state, have lasted for significantly longer than many other groups (Jones and Libicki 2008; 
Hofstede 1983)  Thus I predict: 
34 
H6: Changes in a state’s individualism  will have an effect on the duration of a terrorist group. 
When looking at the relationship between the dimensions and longevity, there seems to be some 
potential positive and negative relationships. Cultural factors have been known to influence 
behavior on an individual level, group level as well as a national level (Hofstede 1985). By 
looking at these dimensions, my analysis can potentially give insight on a pattern as to how 
culture effects group longevity among terrorist groups. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
METHODS 
 
 
Data construction 
To test my hypotheses relating culture to group longevity, I create a unique group/country-year 
dataset using Jones and Libicki’s (2008) How Terrorist Groups End dataset.3 This dataset 
provides information on 648 terrorist groups across the world. Each group has a location(s) - 
where its activities took place, a starting year, and (in most cases) an ending year.  I converted 
this data, which had one group/country per observation, into group country/year data.  This means 
that each observation in the dataset corresponds to one year in each of the countries the group was 
known to operate in.  In conjunction with Jones and Libicki’s (2008) data,
                                                             
3 These data were originally compiled in the RAND-MIPT database.   
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I use Hofstede’s (1983) Country Comparison Tool to assign each country with necessary cultural 
details.  For states not included in this dataset, I consulted Khashman and Large (2012) for the 
remaining state scores. Khashman and Large (2012) used the same measuring methods, 
conducted by Hofstede (year) in order to study cultural dimensions for their study on organization 
behavior in Middle Eastern and North African countries.  
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is a dichotomous indicator that notes when the group “dies” or exits the 
dataset.  A group exits the dataset upon the last known year it has conducted an attack.  It is also 
important to note that because the dataset begins in 1866 and ends in 2006, there are a number of 
instances where the dataset ends before the group does – something known as right-censoring.  
The dataset includes 648 groups with 394 of them ending before the end date of the data set and 
254 groups being right censored.  
Independent variables 
For the independent variables, I use all six of Hofstede’s (2010) cultural dimensions. The 
variables are specifically related to the dimensions discussed earlier: Power Distance, 
Uncertainty, Masculine, Restraint, Long Term Orientation, and Individualism. All of these 
variables are scored on a scale from 0 to 100.   The use of a continuous scale, rather than a simple 
dichotomy, helps to capture the amount of cultural heterogeneity that exists in the world.  This 
also helps reveal the degree to which a state may lean culturally.  For example, a state that scores 
5 on the masculinity dimension, like Sweden, is weakly masculine; while a state like Albania, 
with a score of 80, is strongly masculine. The scores for the Arab countries Sudan, Tunisia, Qatar, 
Oman, Yemen come from Khashman and Large (2012).  Their study used the same dimensions 
and timespan as Hofstede (year); this helps to keep the scores consistent between their study and 
Hofstede’s (1985) work.  
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Control Variables 
It is also important to control for other variables that may affect group longevity.  To do this, I 
will be using a number of group and state-level variables.  My first control accounts for the 
impact that regime type has on group longevity.  Previous studies have shown that democracies 
are able to enact antiterrorism measures more frequently than non-democratic states (Wilkinson 
2001). Kydd and Walter (2006) note that terrorist organizations should last longer in 
democracies.  This occurs because democracies are limited in their ability to monitor and 
specifically target terrorist groups; while democracies have more leeway in retaliating against 
terrorist groups. I control for regime type by using a variable based on the Polity data (Marshall, 
Gurr and Jaggers 2017), which simply indicates whether or not a state is considered a 
democracy.4 
A second control is a state’s level of economic development. This may be important for group 
longevity because, according to Muller (1985), economically poor states may experience 
constraints that prevent groups from operating since they may not have access to the materials 
they need to stay active. I control for this effect by including a measure for GDP per capita (unit 
of analysis is in dollar amounts).  The information for this variable comes from the World Bank 
Development Indicators (World Bank n.d.). 
A state’s population (Gleditsch) may also affect group longevity (unit of analysis is measured in 
1,000s).  Research shows that states with larger populations are more at risk for terrorist attacks 
(Eyerman 1998). In addition to greater risk, states with a large population also harbor more 
terrorist groups and have a greater number of potential targets (Savun and Phillips 2009). Higher 
populations equate to more potential members and recruits, which may increase the groups 
duration since there are more active members equate to longer durations for groups.  
                                                             
4 Following past work, states are a democracy if they have a Polity score than exceeds 5.   
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The presence of civil war may also have an impact on group longevity.  According to Findley and 
Young (2012), terrorism is more prevalent during  a civil war.  This occurs because groups are 
more likely to commit acts of terrorism due to the prevalent violence within the state. Groups 
may also last longer during civil wars because of the constant violence and the presence of 
recruits. Data for the presence of civil war comes from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program 
(Allansson et al. 2017; Gleditsch et al. 2002).   
Next, I control for the size of the group, which varies between 10s, 100s, 1,000s in regard to how 
population is measured. The membership size may have an influence on whether or not groups 
have longer or shorter durations. Studies have found that group size does in fact, influence the 
survival of terrorist groups (Blomberg, Gaibulloev and Sandler 2011). In particular, they find that 
larger groups have a longer duration.  Data for group size comes from the Jones and Libicki 
(2008) dataset.  
Finally, I account for group ideology.  Many scholars (Rapoport 1984; Juergensmayer 200; 
Piazza 2009) believe that religious organizations have the greatest potential for a long duration.  
This occurs because religious motivations can align both the individual member’s and the group’s 
goals into a common goal (Horowitz 2009). To assess this, I use the categories utilized by Jones 
and Libicki (2008): left-wing, religious, nationalist and right-wing. Rather than control for all 
four ideologies, I divide them as either religious or secular. Groups that are religious are indicated 
with a 1 in the dataset while secular organizations (those that are nationalist, left-wing, and right-
wing) are denoted with 0.   
Data Analysis 
Because this research seeks to assess the factors that affect the duration of a terrorist organization, 
I employ a survival model. Survival models allow for the analysis of time and its connection to 
certain variables that lead up to certain events like death, a common occurrence in studies of 
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biology (Allison 1995; Ezell et al. 2003).   In this study, groups exit the dataset – or “die off” – 
with the last year listed in the Jones and Libicki (2008) data.  
Because I make do not make assumptions about the baseline hazard of the model, I am utilizing a 
proportional hazard – or Cox – model.  This model allows for the measure of time that leads up to 
a specific and discrete event. This is a useful model; Bartels and Brady (1993) believe that this 
type of model is most appropriate when aiming to estimate duration within a data set. For this 
study, I am using years as my method of measuring time, leading up to the dismantling and 
dissemination of a terrorist group. Cox Proportional Hazard models run analysis in where the 
discrete event can only be experienced once, therefore the model more so estimates as opposed to 
providing exact calculation of when a group dies off.
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
FINDINGS & CONCLUSION 
 
 
ANALYSIS 
The results indicate support for three of my six hypotheses.5  I use hazard rates to interpret the 
statistical effect of my variables.  The hazard rate is “the exponent of the coefficient.  Its 
deviation from the value of one indicates the percent increase or decrease in the likelihood of the 
incident occurring” (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003, 327).  For example, in this analysis, this means 
that the variable for individualism suggests that as a country’s individualism score increases by 1, 
a group becomes 1 percent less likely to fail in a given year.
                                                             
5 A quick refresher of the cultural dimensions can be found in Geert Hofstede’s Dimensionalizing Cultures: 
The Hofstede Model in Context (2011) pages 9-16. 
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Table 1: Cox Regression Results for Terrorist/Insurgent Group Longevity Rates 
  
Variables Cox Proportional Hazards Model Extended Cox Model  
   
Power Distance .99*** 
(.003) 
.42 
(.099) 
Individualism  1.03*** 
(.004) 
53.01*** 
(.000) 
Masculinity  1.02*** 
(.003) 
1.18 
(.778) 
Uncertainty Avoidance  1.01*** 
(.004) 
1.40 
(.640) 
Long Term Orientation  1.00 
(.004) 
4.56** 
(.049) 
Restraint  1.01*** 
(.003) 
6.53*** 
(.001) 
Longevity .95*** 
(.006) 
.02*** 
(.005) 
Group Size 1.00 
(.000) 
.99 
(.298) 
Democracy .57*** 
(.093) 
1.56*** 
(.001) 
GDP per capita 1.00*** 
(9.52) 
.98*** 
(.001) 
Population 1.00 
(3.92) 
.99 
(.107) 
Religious Ideology .24*** 
(.044) 
.7.11** 
(.037) 
Civil War .99 
(.015) 
4.30 
(.344) 
Time x Power Distance  
 
1.00 
(.103) 
Time x Individualism   .99*** 
(.000) 
Time x Masculinity   .99 
(.796) 
Time x Uncertainty Avoidance   .99 
(.649) 
Time x Long Term Orientation   .99** 
(.049) 
Time x Restraint   .99*** 
(.001) 
Time x Longevity  
 
1.00*** 
(.005) 
Time x Group Size  1.00 
(.298) 
Time x Democracy  1.05*** 
(.002) 
Time x GDP per capita  1.00*** 
(.000) 
Time x Population  1.00 
(.108) 
Time x Religious Ideology  1.05** 
(.039) 
Time x Interaction Time x Civil War  1.01 
(.346) 
   
No. of Subjects 638 638 
No. of Failures 379 379 
No. of Observations 6,563 6,563 
   
Log likelihood -2164.7406 -2133.6356 
LR chi2 285.63*** 347.84*** 
Note: Hazard Ratios with robust standard errors clustered on group in parentheses. * Significant at .10, ** Significant at .05, *** Significant at .01 
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Results 
The results indicate support for three of my six hypotheses.6  I use hazard rates to interpret the 
statistical effect of my variables.  The hazard rate is “the exponent of the coefficient.  Its 
deviation from the value of one indicates the percent increase or decrease in the likelihood of the 
incident occurring” (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003, 327).  For example, in this analysis, this means 
that the variable for individualism suggests that as a country’s individualism score increases by 1, 
a group becomes 1 percent less likely to fail in a given year. The original model violated the 
proportional hazard assumption; therefore, an extended Cox proportional hazard model was ran to 
analyze the interaction between the independent variables in order to account for the violation in 
the first model.  
Beginning with power distance, there is not a significant relationship with group failure. This 
finding, which does not support my hypothesis, indicates that a state’s power distance does not 
affect whether or not a group lasts long.  This essentially may indicate that states on both ends of 
the power distance dimension experience groups that last for shorter and longer periods of time. 
Hierarchy, thus does not play a significant role in whether or not a group survives or dies within 
its respective environment.  
The result for the individualism dimension was significant, supporting my hypothesis. The result 
suggests that there is a relationship between whether or not a group is collectivistic or 
individualistic. This means that as states shift to either side of the dimension, groups survive or 
die off at different rates. This finding illustrates the idea that groups that have a “we” mentality 
versus those who are more “I” oriented tend to survive and die at varying rates.  
                                                             
6 A quick refresher of the cultural dimensions can be found in Geert Hofstede’s Dimensionalizing Cultures: 
The Hofstede Model in Context (2011) pages 9-16. 
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There is not a significant relationship between the masculinity scores and longevity, thus 
nullifying my original hypothesis. This means that neither masculine nor feminine dimensional 
behaviors impact the longevity of groups. This suggests that groups may fall apart regardless of 
whether or not groups exhibit masculine or feminine cooperation behaviors. While one-way 
communication may seem less effective as two-way communication, the other dimensional 
behaviors such as harmony and or competitiveness equally lead to success and failure amongst 
groups.  
The uncertainty avoidance is also insignificant.  This indicates that traditionalist cultures 
experience groups whom tend to either last long or die quickly at the same rate as groups within 
states that are progressive. Contradicting my initial hypothesis, this finding illustrates that social 
behaviors in regard to the tendency to accept or reject change to do not affect whether or not a 
group has the ability to stay alive longer.  This may shed light on the willingness of groups to 
cooperate regardless of progressiveness and or traditionalism.   
As for the next dimension, Long Term dimension the result was significant. This indicates that a 
group’s ability to plan ahead and respond accordingly both have an impact on whether or not the 
groups survives. While that relationship may vary and swing one way or another, this backs up 
my hypothesis and sheds light on how planning behaviors within a group significantly influence 
the duration of the group, which may indicate what type of states will experience these groups at 
higher rates.     
Lastly, the restraint has a significant relationship with organizational failure. This indicates that 
whether groups are either more restrained or indulgent, there is a significant impact on how long 
the groups lasts. This supports my hypothesis, illustrating that self-interest, can impact whether or 
not the groups as whole will succeed and manage to stay alive in their respective environments.   
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The control variables provide a number of different results. The democracy variable was 
significant, indicating a relationship between duration and whether or not a group was in a 
democratic or non-democratic state. This is in line with previous works (Schmid 1992; 
Chenoweth 2013; Wolverson 1999) on the link between democracy and terrorism - democracies 
provide a favorable operating environment because of their respect for civil liberties (Li 2005). 
Essentially, they are less likely to end the more democratic they are impacted by a state GDP. 
This is likely due to the construction of the variable; the results show the percent increase per a $1 
increase in GDP.  This variable would have a larger effect if I changed units to thousands.   
Group size was not statistically significant. This suggests, contrary to the organizational 
literature, that the ability for the group to remain active is independent of the size of the group 
(Sandler 2014)  This is an interesting non-finding because terrorist organizations, like other types 
of organizations, should be sensitive to the free rider problem (Olson 1965).  The lack of a 
finding does not suggest that these groups do not suffer these types of problems, but the fact that 
size has no effect on organizational failure is interesting.  
Neither population nor civil war was significant, indicating no effect on organizational failure. 
Whether a group was religious had a significant impact on organizational failure.  Groups that 
were religious, as opposed to secular groups (nationalist, left-wing, or right-wing), were 
significantly impacted in regard to success and failure..  This means that while the literature 
shows that the motivation for terrorism may increase with religious ideology, the ability for these 
groups to successfully stay alive is limited compared to groups that have no religious motivations. 
Religion does in fact evoke intense emotions, therefore, this may illustrate that religion within an 
organization can have significant negative effects on group morale and cooperation (Horowitz 
2009).     
CONCLUSION 
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This study has sought to explore the potential reasons why some groups last longer than others.  
Contrary to previous studies that have used traditional structural variables such as state-level 
variables, the ideology of the group, or its goals to examine the longevity of the group, this study 
has utilized culture as its main explanatory factors.  It has found that the culture of a state does, in 
fact, impact these groups ability to remain active within their respective states. This study, 
suggests that there may in fact be a connection between culture and terrorist group longevity. 
While the findings are not strongly directional, indicating either positive or negative relationships, 
the results still illustrate that there is an influence on group longevity. Hierarchy, gender 
behaviors social traditionalism have no impact on the duration of these groups. Cooperation, 
planning and goal seeking behavior seem to be the cultural influences that have the significant 
impact, illustrating how these implications can result in groups that last extended periods of times 
versus groups that have shorter lifespans. This further shows that while terrorist groups have their 
own religious and or political goals, they are still groups influenced by state culture, therefore 
bridging the gap between terrorist groups and “legitimate” groups. The state culture influences 
the behaviors of the people within the groups and Brannan et al (2001) say it best when they state 
that “terrorism is in fact a social phenomenon, and “terrorists” are human beings and groups of 
human beings with views and convictions, forming parts of human society regardless of political 
or religious convictions” (19). 
Caveats 
This approach should not suggest that some cultures are more prone to terrorism than others.  
This type of rhetoric is already all too prevalent; most notably in the affinity of some media 
outlets, pundits, and “think tanks” to blame Islamic culture as a whole for acts of terrorism (Saeed 
2007; Powell 2011; Karim 2003; Poole 2002; Akbrsadeh and Smith 2005). Powell (2011) 
examined how Islam has developed a negative connotation since the attack on September 11th, 
2001. Additionally, Muslims are targeted often times by the media and pundits due to the lack of 
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understanding of how true religion operates, even years after the initial 9/11 attacks (Yusof et al 
2013). Instead, this approach discusses a better approach by standardizing culture, and removing 
any religious, ethnic or racial influences. Removing these factors allows for a more universal 
approach to analyzing this relationship and eliminates the ability to pinpoint an individual culture 
or state as being more prone to terrorism.  
Strengths 
I believe this study can begin the discussion and open the gate into more studies on the role of 
culture on terrorism.  Political science has a hard time with culture; it is often used qualitatively 
(Smollan and Sayers 2009; Alalassuutari 1995; House et al 2004; Van Dyck et al 2005) and, as a 
result, has been very difficult to operationalize.  Others believe that culture is dangerous because 
it has the potential to veer political science into discussions about one culture versus another 
(Sheppard 2006; Ehrlick and Liu 2002; Tololyan 2017). Still others believe it is not important, as 
it is largely covered by other state-level variables (Beugelsdijk et al 2015). The method in this 
study eliminates the ability to exclusively pit one culture or state against another in regard to the 
conduciveness of a state’s environment for terrorist groups.  Each state, essentially has cultural 
characteristics which both help and hinder the longevity of terrorist organizations.   
Neglecting culture is detrimental to political science; people are the very construct of political 
science.  To deny culture denies people; it furthermore deprives political science work of context.  
A deeper understanding of political science findings is forfeited for generalizability and our 
theories will have no true understanding of their social influences.  By operationalizing culture in 
the way this studied approached it, we can begin to quantify a construct that is traditionally 
measured qualitatively. By tapping into culture, we can bridge the gap between political science 
and sociology as well as better understand the various intricacies of human behavior and group 
behavior, which in turn influences a state’s environment.  
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Limitations 
This study also has some limitations.  Terrorist group data is not always widely available for 
researchers. This means that I use a very limited set of groups through Jones and Libicki (2008); 
terrorist groups are largely covert and, in many instances, information on these groups are often 
limited if not classified or unavailable.  Additionally, culture can be misinterpreted as defining a 
specific group of people on the bases of race, ethnicity or religion; therefore, it important to 
clearly define how culture is being operationalized. This way over generalization of a population 
can be eliminated.  
It is also possible that the effect of culture may be overstated, as this study relies on a very limited 
set of terrorist groups.  If these groups are sensitive to culture, but excluded groups are not, then 
this means that culture appears to be more influential than it actually is.  By having more data on 
a wider variety of groups, then a better relationship can be drawn with more confidence. Another 
limitation is the lack of cultural data on Central African countries. This is due to the lack of 
information flowing from these countries as well as the general lack of formal research covering 
these countries in cultural sociology (although see Metcalfe 2006). The lack of cases has the 
potential to skew my study by not having an accurate representation of groups within the Middle 
East North Africa (MENA) region.  
Regarding policy implications, this study may provide insight on how a state’s culture may 
influence the behavior and actions of its terrorist groups. By understanding this, states have the 
potential to modify their social policies in order to possibly curb the duration of these terrorist 
groups.  For example, individuals access to small arms and light weapons may affect how long 
groups are able to remain active, which may be related to cultures who are more indulgent 
(Oosthuysen 1996). By enforcing more constraints on access to arms, group longevity may 
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decrease due limited access to this one resources. While this may not make an immediate impact 
on the longevity of these groups, it has the potential to decrease a group’s longevity over time.  
Additionally, this can potentially help foreign policy by indicating the ways in which policy can 
enable terrorist groups across state borders. Trade practices in regard to the import and exporting 
of goods may impact how long terrorist groups remain active. Groups who are more long-term 
oriented as noted earlier in this study, prepare for the future in advance, and trade to gain 
materials for future use.  Enacting regulations on trade practices amongst states, can slowly curb 
the access to raw materials that allow terrorist groups to operate within state lines.    
Overall this study is exploratory in nature and begins to look at the potential impact culture has 
on group longevity. By taking an exploratory approach this study has the ability to adapt and 
change over time as more information is collected on terrorist groups. Additionally, this study can 
effectively establish a foundation to build off of in order for other studies to further expand the 
cultural implications. By gaining a better understanding of culture and the relationship with 
terrorism, other avenues of terrorist group behavior can start to be explored, to further analyze the 
impact of culture.  
Future Research 
Future work on the relationship between culture and terrorism is important in order to better 
understand how these groups work. This type of study could be expanded to potentially look at 
gangs and cartels. While Jones and Libicki (2008) do include a few cartels in their data, 
examining these organizations in-depth can help scholars understand the organizational behavior 
of these groups. Terrorists are not void of cultural influences and do not act on behalf of 
uninfluenced socio-cultural behavior, so neither should gangs and cartels (Hagedorn 2005; 
Brenner 2011). This essentially could increase the amount of groups examined to ensure that 
culture is in fact a variable that does impact the wider success of violent groups within society. 
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By expanding the scope, culture has the potential to be more generalizable therefore taken into 
consideration by more terrorism scholars. Similarly, it would be interesting to examine the 
potential influence culture as defined by Hofstede, has on the group behavior of the military and 
law enforcement. 
In addition to the research idea mentioned above, more research in how terrorist groups work as 
an organization can be beneficial to terrorism literature. The among of literature available on the 
“business operations” of terrorist groups is limited and this study suggests that it may be fruitful 
to explore the organizational side of terrorism groups more than it has been thus far (Crenshaw 
1985, 1989; Oots 1986, 1989; Phillips 2015; Enders and Su 2007; Diesner and Carley 2004; 
Demiroz and Kapucu 2012; Qin et al 2005). Potentially merging organizational and management 
theories with group studies for terrorist longevity or attacks may provide a more contextual 
analysis of how these groups operate and succeed as well.  
Many states share similar cultural traits and can be on two different continents. Finding the thread 
of these similarities and weaving them together can produce a framework in which advancements 
can be made in the relationship of political science and sociology. While the two fields are often 
studied independently, the two are very similar in regard to their subject matter. While political 
science typically examines phenomena on a state level, sociology focuses more on group level 
(Harrison, Price and Bell 1998). Merging the two fields together can create a more holistic 
approach to understanding specific behaviors. This study essentially intertwines the two fields 
together to explore a fairly untouched facet of terrorism literature, resulting in interesting 
findings. While taking into consideration that there are outside influences that may not have been 
addressed in this study, a connection can be seen between culture and the way terrorist groups 
operate. Additionally, understanding the behavioral interactions between individuals within 
groups is crucial to understanding how these groups succeed.  Hopefully this is just the beginning 
of researching the effects culture plays in the roles of terrorism. Understanding even more about 
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terrorism brings us closer to understanding how to defeat them and keep them from succeeding 
with their attacks on humanity.
51 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
 
 
1. Abbasi, S. M., Hollman, K. W. (1993) Business Success in the Middle East, 
Management Decision, 31(1), 55-59.  
2. Alcantara-Pilar, Barrio-García, 2015, Antecedents of attitudes toward the website, 
the moderating role of long-term orientation and individualism, Cross Cultural 
Management , Vol. 22 No. 3, pp. 379-404. 
3. Alex P. Schmid (2007) Terrorism and democracy, Terrorism and Political 
Violence, 4:4, 14-25,DOI: 10.1080/09546559208427173 
4. Alexander, Y., Brenner, E. H., & Krause, S. T. (Eds.). (2008). Turkey: Terrorism, 
civil rights, and the European Union. Routledge. 
5. Alexander, Y., Brenner, E. H., & Krause, S. T. (Eds.). (2008). Turkey: Terrorism, 
civil rights, and the European Union. Routledge 
6. Allansson, Marie, Erik Melander & Lotta Themnér (2017) Organized violence, 
1989-2016. Journal of Peace Research 54(4). 
52 
 
7. Axelrod, R.: The dissemination of culture: A model with local convergence and 
global polarization. The Journal of Conflict Resolution 41(2) (1997) 203–226 
8. Bal, I., & Ozkan, E. (2006). Dunyada Onemli Olaylar Kronolojisi - PKK Teror 
Orgutu Kronolojisi (1976– 2006). Uluslararasi Stratejik Arastirmalar Kurumu 
9. Bandura, A., & Cervone, D. (1984) Differential engagement of self-reactive 
influences in cognitively-based motivation. Stanford University. 
10. Barkey, H. J., & Fuller, G. E. (1997). Turkey’s Kurdish question: Critical turning 
points and missed opportunities. The Middle East Journal, 59–79. 
11. Beugelsdijk, S., Maseland, R., & van Hoorn, A, (2015). Are scores on Hofstede's 
dimensions of national cultures stable over time? A cohort analysis. Global 
Strategy Journal, 5, 223- 240.  
12. Brislin, R., Understanding Culture's Influence on Behaviour, Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, Fort Worth, 1993.  
13. Bochner, S. , & Hesketh, B. (1994). Power distance, individualism/collectivism, 
and job-related attitudes in a culturally diverse work group. Journal of Cross-
Cultural Psychology, 25 (2), 233-257.  
14. Bond, M. H. (Ed.). (1986). The psychology of the Chinese people. Hong Kong: 
Oxford University Press. 
15. Brumann, C.: Writing for culture: Why a successful concept should not be 
discarded [and comments and reply]. Current Anthropology 40 (1999) 
16. Chan, S. (1999). The Chinese learner - a question of style. Education and 
Training, 41, 294- 304. 
53 
 
17. Chenoweth, Erica. (2013). Terrorism and Democracy. Annual Review of Political 
Science. 16. 10.1146/annurev-polisci-032211-221825. 
18. Cherney, Adrian & Murphy, Kristina. (2013). Policing terrorism with procedural 
justice: The role of police legitimacy and law legitimacy. Australian and New 
Zealand Journal of Criminology. 46. 403. 10.1177/0004865813485072. 
19. Collier, P., Hoeffler, A., & Rohner, D. (2009). Beyond greed and grievance: 
feasibility and civil war. Oxford Economic Papers, 61(1), 1–27. 
20. Crenshaw-Hutchinson, M. (1972). The concept of revolutionary terrorism. Journal 
of Conflict Resolution, 383–396 
21. Crenshaw, Martha (1981). “The Causes of Terrorism.” Comparative Politics, vol. 
13(4), pp. 379–399. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/421717. 
22. Criss, N., & Cetiner, Y. (2000). Terrorism and the Issue of International 
Cooperation. Journal of Conflict Studies, 20(1). Retrieved 
from https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/JCS/article/view/4337/4976 
23. Cronjé, J. (2011). Using Hofstede's cultural dimensions to interpret cross-cultural 
blended teaching and learning. Computer and Education, 56, 596-603.  
24. Don Y. Lee, Philip L. Dawes (2005) Guanxi, Trust, and Long-Term Orientation 
in Chinese Business Markets. Journal of International Marketing: Summer 2005, 
Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 28-56. 
25. EG Krug, KE Powell, LL Dahlberg; Firearm-related deaths in the United States 
and 35 other high- and upper-middle- income countries, International Journal of 
Epidemiology, Volume 27, Issue 2, 1 April 1998, Pages 214–
221, https://doi.org/10.1093/ije/27.2.214 
54 
 
26. Elling, R. C. (2008). State of Mind, State of Order: Reactions to Ethnic Unrest in 
the Islamic Republic of Iran. Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism, 8(3), 481-501. 
27. Faitar, G. (2006). Individualism versus collectivism in schools. College Quarterly, 
9. Retrieved from: http://www.senecacollege.ca/quarterly/2006-vol09-num04-
fall/faitar.html  
28. Fanon, Frantz. 1963. The Wretched of the Earth. Grove Weidenfeld A division of 
Grove Press, Inc. 
29. Fearon, J. D., & Laitin, D. D. (2003). Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war. The 
American Political Science Review, 97(01), 75–90 
30. Findley, M. G., & Young, J. K. (2012). Terrorism and civil war: a spatial and 
temporal approach to a conceptual problem. Perspectives on Politics, 10(02), 
285–305. 
31. Gist, M. (1987). Self-Efficacy: Implications for Organizational Behavior and 
Human Resource Management. The Academy of Management Review, 12(3), 472-
485. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/258514 
32. Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, 
and Håvard Strand (2002) Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset. Journal of 
Peace Research 39(5).  
33. 7. Gunykunst, W. B., Ting-Toomey. S., Culture and Interpersonal 
Communication, Sage, Newbury Park, California, 1988.  
34. Gurr, T. R. (1970). Why men rebel. Princeton, PUP 
35. Gurr, Ted. 1968. "A Causal Model of Civil Strife." American Political Science 
Review 62 (4):1104-24. http://www.econis.eu/PPNSET?PPN=478167385. 
55 
 
36. HALL, E.T., 1976. Beyond Culture. New York: Anchor Books/Doubleday.  
37. Harry Eckstein. 1965. "On the Etiology of Internal Wars." History and Theory 4 
(2) (Jan 1,):133-63. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2504149. 
38. Hofstede, G. (1980). Culture's consequences: International differences in work-
related values. Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications.  
39. Hofstede, G. (1985), THE INTERACTION BETWEEN NATIONAL AND 
ORGANIZATIONAL VALUE SYSTEMS[1]. Journal of Management Studies, 
22: 347-357.  
40. Hofstede, G. (1986). Cultural differences in teaching and learning. International 
Journal of Intercultural Relations, 10, 301-320.  
41. Hofstede, G., & Bond, M.H. (1988). "The Confucius connection: From cultural 
roots to economic growth." Organizational Dynamics 16, 4-21.  
42. Hofstede, G., & Hofstede, G-J. (2001). Culture's Consequences (2nd Ed.). 
London, UK: Sage Books.  
43. Hofstede, G., & Hofstede, G. J. (1991). “Cultures and Organizations: Software of 
The Mind.” New York, NY: McGraw-Hill. 
44. Hofstede, G., & Hofstede, G. J. (2005). Cultures and organizations: Software of 
the mind (2nd Ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.  
45. Hofstede, G., Hofstede, G.J., & Minkov, M. (2010). Cultures and organizations: 
Software of the mind (3rd Ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill. 
46. Hofstede, Geert. (2001). Culture's Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, 
Institutions and Organizations across Nations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
56 
 
47. Hofstede, Geert. (2011). Dimensionalizing Cultures: The Hofstede Model in 
Context. Online Readings in Psychology and Culture, 2(1). 
48. Jackson, Brian A., John C. Baker, Peter Chalk, Kim Cragin, John V. Parachini, 
and Horacio R. Trujillo, Aptitude for Destruction, Volume 2: Case Studies of 
Organizational Learning in Five Terrorist Groups. Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation, 2005. https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG332.html. Also 
available in print form. 
49. Jaspars, J. , & Hewstone, M. (1982). Cross-cultural interaction, social attribution 
and inter-group relations. In S. Bochner (Ed.), Cultures in contact: Studies in 
cross-cultural interaction. Oxford: Pergamon 
50. Joes, A. J. (2006). Resisting rebellion: The history and politics of 
counterinsurgency. University Press of Kentucky 
51. Johnson, Chalmers A. 1966. Revolutionary Change. Boston: Little,Brown. 
52. Jones, S. G., & Libicki, M. C. (2008). How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for 
Countering Al Qaida. Santa Monica, CA: Rand. 
53. Kalim Bahadur, 2001. "Agra Summit and India Pakistan Relations," India 
Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs, , vol. 57(2), pages 29-38, April. 
54. KARBER, P. (1971). URBAN TERRORISM: BASELINE DATA AND A 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK. Social Science Quarterly,52(3), 521-533. 
Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/42858799 
55. Kashima, E., & Kashima, Y. (1998). Culture and language: The case of cultural 
dimensions and personal pronoun use. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 29, 
461-86.  
57 
 
56. Kiras, J. D. (2007). Irregular warfare: Terrorism and insurgency. Understanding 
Modern Warfare, 224. 
57. Kirisci, K., & Winrow, G. (1997). The Kurdish question and turkey. London: 
Frank Cass.  
58. Kluckhohn, F.R., & Strodtbeck, F.L. (1961). Variations in Value Orientations. 
Westport, CT: Greenwood 
59. Kocher, M. (2007). The decline of PKK and the viability of a one-state solution in 
Turkey. Democracy and Human Rights in Multicultural Societies, 93. 
60. Kroeber, A.L., Kluckhohn, C.: Culture: A critical review of concepts and 
definitions. Papers of the Peabody Museum 47 (1952) 643–656 
61. Kuhn, M. H. , & McPartland, T. (1954). An empirical investigation of self-
attitudes. American Sociological Review, 19, 68-76 
62. Kuhn, P. M., & Weidmann, N. B. (2015). Unequal We Fight: Between- and 
Within-Group Inequality and Ethnic Civil War. PSRM Political Science Research 
and Methods, 3(03), 543-568. 
63. Lamoreaux, M., & Merling, B. (2012). Outside the head and outside 
individualism collectivism: Further meta-analyses of cultural products. Journal of 
Cross-Cultural Psychology, 43, 299-327.  
64. Leung, K., Bhagat, R.S., Buchan, N.R., Erez, M., & Gibson, C.B. (2005). Culture 
and international business: Recent advances and their implications for future 
research. Journal of International Business Studies, 36, 357-378. 
65. Litrell, R. (2012). Cultural Value Dimension Theories: Hofstede -A Work in 
Progress. Insights, 12, 3-6. 
58 
 
66. Lundahl M. (2004) Among the Believers: The Emerging Threat to Global 
Society. In: Södersten B. (eds) Globalization and the Welfare State. 
International Political Economy Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London 
67. Marcus, A. (2007). Blood and belief: The PKK and the Kurdish fight for 
independence. New York University Press 
68. Markus, H. R. , & Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture and the self: Implications for 
cognition, emotion, and motivation. Psychological Review, 98, 224-253. 
69. Mars, Perry. 1975. "The Nature of Political Violence." Social and Economic 
Studies 24 (2):221-38. http://www.econis.eu/PPNSET?PPN=472637622. 
70. Metcalf, L. E., Bird, A., Peterson, M. F., Shankarmahesh, M., & Lituchy, T. R. 
(2007). Cultural influences in negotiations: A four country comparative analysis, 
International Journal of Cross Cultural Management, 7, 147-68. 
71. Michael Minkov, Geert Hofstede, 2011, The evolution of Hofstede’s doctrine, 
Cross Cultural Management: An International Journal, Vol. 18 No. 1, pp. 10-20. 
72. Moynihan, D. P. (1993). Pandaemonium: Ethnicity in international politics. 
Oxford University Press 
73. Nisbett, R.E. (2003). The geography of thought: How Asians and westerners think 
differently... And why. New York, NY: Free Press. 
74. O’Reilly, C.: Corporations, culture, and commitment: Motivation and social 
control in organizations. California Management Review 31(4) (1989) 9–25 
75. Oyserman, D., and Lee, S. (2008). Does culture influence what and how we 
think? Effects of priming individualism and collectivism. Psychological Bulletin, 
134, 311-342. 
59 
 
76. Paolo Mauro; Corruption and Growth, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
Volume 110, Issue 3, 1 August 1995, Pages 681–
712, https://doi.org/10.2307/2946696 
77. Pew data summarized in the Council on Foreign Relations Report, ‘‘Public 
Opinion on Global Issues: A New Digest of International and U.S. Attitudes’’ 
(2010), Chapter 4A World Opinion on Terrorism 
78. Porter, P. (2007). Good anthropology, bad history: The cultural turn in studying 
war.Parameters, 37(2), 45-58. Retrieved from 
http://argo.library.okstate.edu/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/198
049222?accountid=4117 
79. Ramraj, V. V. (2006). Counter-terrorism policy and minority alienation: some 
lessons from Northern Ireland. Singapore Journal of Legal Studies, 385–404. 
80. Sambanis, N. (2008). Terrorism and civil war. In P. Keefer and N. Loayza, (Ed.). 
Terrorism, economic development, and political openness. Cambridge University 
Press. 
81. Sánchez-Cuenca, I., & De la Calle, L. (2009). Domestic terrorism: the hidden side 
of political violence. Annual Review of Political Science, 12, 31–49. 
82. Simsek, Y. (2006). Impact of terrorism on migration patterns in Turkey (Ph.D. 
Dissertation). Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, 
Virginia.https://digarchive.library.vcu.edu/bitstream/handle/ 
10156/1311/simseky_phd.pdf?sequence=1. Accessed 05 Aug 2014. 
83. Samovar, L. A., Porter, R. E., Communication between Cultures, Wadsworth, 
Belmont, California, 1991.  
60 
 
84. Sorel, Georges. 1999. Reflections on ViolenceCambridge University Press. 
85. Stepanova, E. A. (2008). Terrorism in asymmetrical conflict: Ideological and 
structural aspects (No. 23). Oxford University Press. 
86. Tananuraksakul, N. (2013). Power distance reduction and positive reinforcement: 
EFL learners’ confidence and linguistic identity. International Journal of 
Language Studies, 7, 103-116. 79  
87. Taras, V., & Steel, P. (2009). Beyond Hofstede: Challenging the ten 
commandments of crosscultural research. In C. Nakata (Ed.), Beyond Hofstede: 
Culture frameworks for global marketing and management. New York, NY: 
Palgrave MacMillan.  
88. Taras, V., Kirkman, B. L., & Steel, P. (2010). Examining the impact of culture's 
consequences: A three decade, multi-level, meta-analytic review of Hofstede's 
cultural value dimensions. Journal of Applied Psychology, 95, 405-439.  
89. Thackrah, J.R. (2004). Dictionary of Terrorism. New York: Routledge. 
90. Thowfeek, M., & Jaafar, A. (2012). Instructors’ views about implementation of e-
learning system: An analysis based on Hofstede's cultural dimensions. Social and 
Behavioral Sciences, 65, 961-967.  
91. Tilly, C. (2004). Terror, terrorism, terrorists. Sociological Theory, 22(1), 5–13. 
92. Tilly, Charles. 1978. "Collective Violence in European Perspective." 391. 
93. Treven, S.; Treven, U., Cross Cultural Aspects of Managing Diversity, in 
EURAM Conference, European Academy of Management, Paris, May 16- 19, 
2007.  
61 
 
94. Triandis, H. C. (1989). The self and social behavior in differing cultural contexts. 
Psychological Review, 96, 506-520. 
95. Triandis, H. C. (1990). Cross-cultural studies of individualism and collectivism. 
In J. J. Berman (Ed.), Nebraska Symposiwn on Motivation: VoL 37. Cross-
cultural perspectives. Lincoln: University Press of Nebraska 
96. Triandis, H. C. , Bontempo, R., Vllareal, M. J., Asai, M., & Lucca, N. 
(1988). Individualism and collectivism: Cross-cultural perspectives on self-
ingroup relationships. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54, 323-338. 
97. Tylor, Edward. 1920 [1871]. Primitive Culture. New York: J. P. Putnam’s Sons, 
p. 410. 
98. U.S. Department of Defense. United State Army War Strategy. 2005. Al-Qaeda as 
Insurgents. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Department of Defense 
99. U.S. Department of Defense. US Military Academy Training Manual. 2007. 
Insurgents vs. Guerrillas vs. Terrorists. West Point, NY: Department of Defense 
100. Ünal, Mustafa. 2016. "Terrorism Versus Insurgency: A Conceptual 
Analysis." Crime, Law and Social Change 66 (1) (Aug):21-57. 
https://search.proquest.com/docview/1800074310. 
101. Watts, N. F. (2006). Activists in office: pro-Kurdish contentious politics in 
Turkey. Ethnopolitics, 5(2), 125–144. 
102. Wolverson, Herbert Frederick, "Terrorism and Democracy" (1999). MSU 
Graduate Theses. 307.  
https://bearworks.missouristate.edu/theses/307 
103. World Bank. (n.d.). 
62 
 
APPENDICES 
 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Longevity 6,739 25.57 23.43 0 140 
PDI 6,739 60.56 24.20 8 97 
IDV 6,739 41.25 23.75 2 91 
MAS 6,739 69.02 23.29 0 98 
UAI 6,739 66.68 19.28 23 100 
LTO 6,739 36.62 18.36 7 88 
IND 6,739 42.75 25.49 0 100 
Size 6,739 1308.04 2917.43 10 10000 
Demyn 6,739 .602 .489 0 1 
GDP 6,563 9223.43 9699.19 199.01 43766.86 
Population 6,720 124559.4 250150 399 1311020 
Relyn 6,739 .213 .410 0 1 
Civwar 6,739 .365 .481 0 1 
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Table 2: States included in analysis 
Albania, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bhutan, Brazil, 
Bulgaria , Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, China , Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, 
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland , France, Germany, Greece, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary , Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland , Israel, 
Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Malta , Mexico, 
Morocco, Mozambique, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway , Pakistan, Panama, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland , Portugal, Puerto Rico, Russia , Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Sierra Leone, 
South Africa, Salvador, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland , Taiwan, Thailand, 
Turkey, Uruguay , United States, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia, Sri Lanka, Syria, 
Tanzania, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom 
64 
 
Figure 1: Power Distance Index Score Dispersion Map 
 
Note: Scores derived from Hofstede-Insights Country Comparison Tool (2018). Arab 
scores derived from Kashman  (2014). 
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Figure 2: Individualism vs. Collectivism Dispersion Map 
 
Note: Scores derived from Hofstede-Insights Country Comparison Tool (2018). Arab 
scores derived from Kashman  (2014). 
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Figure 3: Masculine vs. Feminine Dispersion Map 
 
Note: Scores derived from Hofstede-Insights Country Comparison Tool (2018). Arab 
scores derived from Kashman  (2014). 
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Figure 4: Uncertainty Avoidance Index Dispersion Map 
 
Note: Scores derived from Hofstede-Insights Country Comparison Tool (2018). Arab 
scores derived from Kashman  (2014). 
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Figure 5: Long Term Orientation vs Short Term Orientation Dispersion Map 
 
Note: Scores derived from Hofstede-Insights Country Comparison Tool (2018). Arab 
scores derived from Kashman  (2014). 
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Figure 6: Indulgence vs Restraint Dispersion Map 
 
Note: Scores derived from Hofstede-Insights Country Comparison Tool (2018). Arab 
scores derived from Kashman  (2014). 
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